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REACTION TO STATE CONTROL
The Case of the Mid-Eastern Transvaal
1955 - 1960
The growth of the bureaucracy is, according to Merton et al, "widely recognised as
one of the major social trends of our time".1 In South Africa this trend has been
identified by a number of writers, many of whom have focused on the Native
Affairs Department (NAD). Dubow has shown how the Native Administration Act
of 1927 laid the foundation for the NAD's growing involvement in matters
affecting Africans. Yudelman, referring to the bureaucracy as a whole, has
identified the revenue generated by gold mining as the element that financed the
expanding bureaucracy. Thus, he links significant periods of bureaucratic growth
with improvements of the gold price. The overall picture that emerges is a state
(particularly the NAD) concerned with control; a concern that, to some extent,
manifests itself through the medium of an expanding bureaucracy.
However, the relationship between this concern and bureaucratic expansion found
its fullest expression when the National Party came to power in 1948. Posel has
argued that, in the environment created by the alliances that the National Party
represented, the NAD's most immediate and pressing concern was the construction
of 'better control"'.2 The bureaucratic structures that resulted laid the foundations
for an unprecedented level of state interference in the lives of South Africans. The
effects of this interference are the subject of this paper.
Essentially, the new NAD policies were aimed against Africans. In the white
farming areas of the mid-eastern Transvaal, the policies attempted to undercut
Africans' bargaining position on the farms. However, while this state intervention
was partially an attempt to bolster the position of white farmers, these intended
beneficiaries were also forced to accept bureaucratic regulation in many spheres
of their lives.
The establishment of this kind of control often leads to conflict. When the state
takes it upon itself to make decisions for the individual, some individuals'
interests will be undermined. This occurs for two reasons. Firstly, because the state
represents a centralisation of decision making, the resulting decision will be based
on the basis of common denominators rather than the variety of interests held by
individuals. Secondly, the state has its own agenda which does not always coincide
with the interests of the individuals it claims to represent. Thus, the state is often
involved in a balancing act between its own interests and those of its constituents.
These processes produce what Burnheim has called, "an insidious tyranny of
numbers. The state homogenises and atomises social relationships. The horizons
and expectations of people contract to the limits of those variations that the system
constitutes as practical possibilities."3 However, this kind of bureaucratic
concordance does not establish itself automatically. Resistance by people who
perceive that their interests will be best served by acting outside the sphere of the
bureaucracy can undermine the efficacy of bureaucratic control.
In South Africa, new bureaucratic structures were to be established in areas where
Africans had never been inclined to passively accepted any proposed restrictions.
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The extent of the control which others were able to exercise over them was
determined by day to day struggles that had a long history. Particularly, the terms
and conditions of labour tenancy were influenced by Africans' ability to use the
threat of withdrawing their labour. This ability was predicated on African mobility
and the existence of viable alternatives to farm labour. The new bureaucracy
threatened to radically undermine those options that still remained for tenants.
But, these measures were not implemented unproblematically. Nor were they
merely shaped by the intentions of officials and legislators. Instead, the reactions
of the people who were the bureaucracy's intended subjects fundamentally
affected the effectiveness and the form of the new controls and enabled Africans
to sustain labour tenant relations.
This paper will concentrate on the reactions of the inhabitants of the mid-eastern
Transvaal to the bureaux and boards created by the state. In this way it is hoped
that valuable insights into the process of the establishment of the new bureaucracy
will be provided. Much has been said about the implications of the labour
legislation of the 1950s.4 However, the actual effect that this legislation had on the
rural areas is still an opaque issue. In this paper the danger of accepting legislation
without analysing its actual impact will become clear. In the mid-eastern
Transvaal, the uneasy relationship between farmers and the bureaucracy, the
resistance of labour tenants and the Department of Justice's refusal to give up
areas of authority to the NAD, all helped to undermine the effectiveness of the
labour bureaux. Similar forces made the implementation of the Labour Tenant
Control Boards an even more difficult process.
Although labour tenancy was the dominant labour relationship on the farms of the
mid-eastern Transvaal during the 1950s, this was a period when it was being
threatened on numerous fronts. The first years the decade have been identified as
a time when the labour shortage, which had been such a prevalent feature of the
previous decades (especially in Agriculture), was slowly coming to an end.5 At the
same time tractors were becoming common on the farms, enabling farmers to do
a lot more work themselves.6 This meant that the demand for labour on the white
farms began to ease and the bargaining power of labour tenants was reduced. The
NAD, the department responsible for the Native Laws Amendment Act, was
determined to undermine this bargaining power still further. By promoting the
establishment, in terms of this act, of at least two labour bureaux in each district,
it was hoped that labour tenant mobility would become a thing of the past
However, despite the apparently favourable position produced by the changes
outlined above, the labour bureaux system faced a number of problems from the
time of their establishment in the mid-eastern Transvaal.
Changes that were discernible at a macro, national level, were not always apparent
at the local level. Although the tide was turning against labour tenants, a number
of factors that were in their favour continued to influence the regional struggle
between master and servant. Such factors could even have an important influence
as residues or memories. In the mid-eastern Transvaal a number of farmers
continued to suffer from labour shortages. This was usually a seasonal labour
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shortage but some farmers still struggled to meet their permanent labour needs.7
Thus, at this transitional stage, a labour surplus was by no means an obvious and
guaranteed phenomenon. It seems likely, therefore, that farmers often kept labour
as an insurance against renewed shortages. The memory of the difficulties
experienced in the past seems to have made farmers wary of losing any labour;
even if they now had more labour than they needed. Thus, labour tenants were
still able to use the threat of withdrawing their labour, against farmers.
Thus, the NAD implemented its policies in an area that, from their point of view,
was far from stable. Furthermore, their difficulties did not all originate from
African opposition. During the initial establishment of local labour bureaux, it
became evident that the co-operation of the relevant municipalities was not always
guaranteed. Local labour bureaux were designed to regulate labour in the
'prescribed' or urban areas. The NAD was determined to establish one of these
bureaux in every town where Africans lived in so called 'locations'. In this way
they hoped to prevent any Africans from living in urban conditions outside the
direct control of the state. These bureaux would also prevent farm labourers from
using residence and employment in the 'locations' as an alternative to farm labour.
The state realised that effective control could only be achieved if this control
extended over the entire country. The inception of the labour bureaux immediately
demonstrated the willingness and ability of Africans to resist controls if
alternatives continued to exist. Districts where new labour bureaux were set up
often complained of an escalating labour shortage. Africans would leave and go
to areas "waar daar nog nie arbeids buros bestaan en hy nie lastig geval word
me."8
While this opposition was clearly a prime motivation for the concern about the
blanket establishment of bureaux, it was also effectively used as a threat against
recalcitrant municipalities. In the eastern Transvaal town of Belfast the town
council did not want to form a local labour bureau. They felt that they did not
have the personnel or the finance to manage such an undertaking. In response, the
Chief Native Commissioner warned the town to expect a major influx of Africans
escaping from other areas where the bureaux were being established. This prospect
was clearly unattractive to the councilors of Belfast. They reversed their earlier
decision and a local labour bureau was established on the 11 June 1954. Similar
processes, with the same result, occurred in the towns of Machadadorp and
Waterval Boven.
The district labour bureaux were usually the responsibility of the local Native
Commissioners who were, in most cases, directly accountable to the NAD. Thus,
the establishment of these bureaux was less problematic and most eastern
Transvaal districts received labour bureaux in 1953. However, in Carolina and
Belfast the NAD did not exercise direct control. As a result, these bureaux, which
fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice, gave NAD officials
numerous headaches and prompted farmers' opposition in various ways. The
details of this process will be discussed below.
In general, the district bureaux's main aim was to supply farmers with labour and
prevent the uncontrolled movement of Africans. If farmers filled in the appropriate
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form (N.A.84) then it was up to the labour bureaux to find labourers that would
meet this demand. No African could leave a district without the permission of the
bureaux. The district bureaux also worked in close conjunction with the local
bureaux to ensure that no 'unnecessary' movement between town and countryside
took place. Furthermore, no African was permitted to leave a district without the
permission of the labour bureaux.
On paper, this looked ominous for Africans living on the farms and it will become
clear that these regulations affected farm labourers in a pernicious way.
Nevertheless, the impact of the bureaux was uneven and not nearly as effective as
most National Party supporters would have hoped.9 Labour tenants were able,
throughout the period being studied here, to find gaps within the system, which
enabled them to maintain some control over their own lives.
In 1955, two years after the establishment of the local and district labour bureaux
in Lydenburg, Mrs Nic Fourie complained that she and her husband were unable
to farm effectively because they could not get any labour. She also claimed that in
the Oshoek area near Dullstroom, in the southern part of the Lydenburg district,
there were seven other farmers that were almost on the verge of leaving their
farms. Most of them had no labour while others had one or two labour tenant
families. There was one farmer in the area, however, who had so much labour that
he had lost track of their number. The labour conditions on his farm closely
approximated the original labour tenant conditions that had been laid down in the
1913 Land Act. Each labour tenant family was expected to supply one member who
had to work three months for the farmer. According to Mrs Fourie, there were no
other obligations and the tenants were largely free to do as they pleased. She also
claimed that there were numerous examples of this kind of unequal distribution
of labour amongst farmers within a single farming area. It seems that labour
tenant-farmers had plenty of labour while others struggled to find someone that
would work for them.
Mrs Fourie and the farmers like her, refused to give in to the pressure exerted by
African's congregation on farms where labour tenant conditions prevailed. She
claimed that, "ons ander boere sien net eenvoudig nie kans om die kaffers onder
so 'n kontrak op ons plase te hou nie en darom kan ons nie volk kry nie".10 The
labour shortage produced by their stance made it difficult for Mrs Fourie and her
neighbours to keep their sons interested in farming. She reported that a number
of their children found farming unattractive and were leaving the rural areas. Still,
Mrs Fourie refused to give in to the labour tenant demands of Africans. While not
abandoning the labour tenant system entirely, the Fouries were adamant that
tenants should work six months for their land. For the rest of the year tenants had
to continue in employment on the farm for about £ 3 a month. Sheep herders got
£ 3.10 and tractor drivers £ 5.
The intransigent position that the Fouries took seems to reflect a stubborn clinging
to principles in the face of reality. However, their 'idealism' was facilitated by two
factors. Firstly, despite their inability to attract labour, they were able to obtain
some workers in the form of prison labour. In this way they kept the farm going.
They also used a tractor, which eased the need for labour. Secondly, the Fouries
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believed that help in the form of further Government intervention was imminent
They clung to this belief despite the labour bureaux's 'disappointing' impact and
in the face of constant taunts from farmers opposed to the National Party. These
opponents claimed that the relevant law would never be applied and that it had
only been passed so that the National Party could win the following election.
The law that they were referring to, the one that the Fouries pinned their hopes on,
was the amendment to Chapter Four of the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act, which
was passed in 1954. In terms of this amendment, Chapter Four would be
proclaimed for the whole of South Africa and Labour Tenant Control Boards
would be set up in all the farming districts where there were labour tenants to
control. So far Lydenburg had not heard any news that such a board would be
created in their district. Many farmers were unsure but hopeful about the precise
provisions of the law. Their was much speculation and the law was discussed
eagerly by farmers like the Fouries. It was hoped that Chapter Four would bring
about an equal distribution of labour that would finally undermine the ability of
Africans to bargain for labour tenant conditions.
The NAD gave Mrs Fourie the assurance that Chapter Four would be implemented.
The difficulty lay in the department's lack of confidence in its capacity to control
the resistance that would emerge once the chapter was enforced. The NAD would
only engage in this exercise when they became convinced that the 'machinery' they
were in the process of setting up, was strong enough to prevent Africans from
deserting rural areas in large numbers.11 It was also explained that the boards
would determine how many labourers a farmer could keep according to their
assessment of how many would be needed to effectively engage in productive
farming. This clearly threatened the position of labour tenants who congregated
on farms, but, it is equally clear that the application and interpretation of this
ruling would be subject to struggles at various levels.
In the mean time the NAD was determined to solve problems like those of the
Fouries by means of the district labour bureau. After looking in to the matter it
became evident that about l/6th of the actual people looking for employment in
Lydenburg passed through the bureau in Lydenburg. The rest managed to evade
the system because they could find employers who did not register their labourers.
Without this registration, the hiring and firing of labour occurred largely outside
the sphere of the labour bureau. The bureau officer claimed that Africans avoided
the bureau because they would not willingly sign themselves over to an employer
if they had not seen and spoken to him. Even those who were channeled by the
bureau would find a way to avoid employers who had a bad reputation. For this
very reason, all attempts to supply the Fouries with labour failed. The sergeant at
the Dullstroom police station claimed, "dat Mnr Fourie baie haastig en hard is en
nie arbeiders kan behou nie. Selfs bandiete wat aan horn verhuur word, loop weg
van horn terug tronk toe."12
It took the labour bureau only a few weeks to contact four labourers that were
willing to work on the farms. However, when they arrived at the bureau and
discovered who their employer to be was, they refused point blank to accept the
employment. Mr Clark, the official in charge of the bureau, declined to force these
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Africans to take up employment with Fourie. He argued that this kind of coercion
would put the labour bureaux system into disrepute with Africans. Thus, while the
bureau struggled to attain the all encompassing function for which it strove, local
officials continued to be concerned about the NAD's image amongst Africans. This
concern led them into decisions that were sometimes directly opposed to the short
term interests of local farmers.
Over the following months the Fouries' position did not improve. The two
prisoners that were in their employ decided to leave and go back to jail. Within
a period of three weeks, the labour bureau sent 34 Africans, who were looking for
work, to Mr Fourie. Not one of them arrived at Mr Fouries farm. On the way they
must have become aware of Fourie's reputation and decided to find work
elsewhere. Thus, in Lydenburg at this time, it was clear that the bureau was not
very effective in controlling African labour. The pervasiveness of such evasions
made farmers very reluctant to use the bureau. Word got round that it was a futile
exercise to register a claim for labour. Those farmers who had done so, claimed
that absolutely no labour was forthcoming. Even the Native Commissioner was
reported to have assured farmers that, "die Naturelle weier beslis om na die boere
te gaan - waar hy hulle heen aanraai. Hulle se hulle wil self werk en woonplek
soek".13
Other districts experienced similar evidence of tenants' refusal to let bureaucratic
machinery control the terms of their employment. A German couple in Middelburg
found 1955 as difficult as the Fouries of Lydenburg. The Hengherrs complained
that: "We farm since five years, and farming is not easy, believe me, and it
becomes impossible and a killing profession if there is no labour available."14 In
reply to these complaints the NAD assured Mrs Hengherr of the positive impact
that the labour bureaux had made since its inception. However, subsequent
investigations proved that the Hengherrs were unable to benefit from the
establishment of a labour bureau in Middelburg. The NAD official investigating
their plight discovered that they were the victims of a boycott.15 Because the
Hengherrs interfered in and attempted to control all the aspects of their labourers'
lives, no one would work for them. Attempts by the bureau to send labour to their
farms did not succeed in changing this situation. Mr Hengherr had initially been
filled with hope by the assurances sent by the NAD and he went to the bureau on
the 3 May 1955. Subsequently, two Africans were sent to him but they never
arrived on his farm. As in Lydenburg, the boycott proved more effective than the
bureau.
The Hengherr's had been living in South Africa for twenty eight years but had
only been farming for five years. Their farm in Middelburg was 500 morgen in
size. 100-120 morgen was ploughed in the summer and planted with maize and
beans. They also kept about 60 head of cattle which facilitated a small dairy, of
which only the cream was sold. Despite realising that labour tenant farmers
experienced "little or no trouble" with their labour, the Hengherrs were determined
to rely on other labour methods. It was estimated that the Hengherrs needed three
Africans in winter and five in summer. Instead they-managed to employ one
"getroude Nyasaland naturel" and an African youth who herded the cattle.
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Nevertheless, despite their lack of success in attracting labour, Mrs Hengherr was
proud of the conditions they offered their employers. She proclaimed: "We pay
three to four pounds per month plus food which I prepare myself and which is
very good. In addition a bed is provided for each labourer ... and also facilities for
a daily bath."16 These conditions failed to impress the local African population.
Freedom to maintain their own social practices, without interference from their
employers, determined African's decisions about where to work. This was an
impulse that Mrs Hengherr, who presumed the universal superiority of 'European'
culture, could not understand. Consequently, she continued to cook her 'very good'
German meals for the solitary farm labourer. He, however, did not appreciate Mrs
Hengherr's German cooking. Instead, he wanted her to give him the ingredients
so that his wife could cook them in the way that he preferred.
Because of their prejudice and inflexibility, the Hengherrs were unable to acquire
any voluntary labour. As a result they had to rely on convict labour which,
according to Mr Hengherr, was also becoming scarce. Farmers were coming from
twenty five miles to collect prisoners from Middelburg prison every morning. The
prison could not spare guards to oversee these prisoners. Instead, Mr Hengherr had
to stand guard with his gun from morning to night, a task about which he
complained bitterly.
The evidence on general farming conditions in Middelburg shows that the
Hengherrs tribulations arose primarily from their refusal to adapt themselves to
the local conditions. The chairman of the Middelburg Farmers Union, Mr J L Brits,
who was probably well placed to judge, stated that Middelburg still suffered from
a labour shortage. However, seventy five per cent of this shortage was seasonal.
Farmers in Middelburg often tried to meet their seasonal demands by going to the
nearby reserve area of Nebo to recruit. Not many farmers made use of the bureau.
Even when they did, they often frustrated officials by not following the correct
procedure. Failure to sign the passbook or return the bottom of the N.A.85 form
meant that even those Africans who had moved into the sphere of the bureau's
control often slipped out again. Thus, most farmers operated outside the sphere of
the bureaux and managed to maintain an adequate, permanent labour force. This
can only be attributed to the fact that the majority of farmers were willing to offer
labour tenant conditions. Mr Hengherr on the other hand stubbornly attempted to
persuade a labour tenant, who had previously worked a six month contract, that
his offer of three pounds a month plus food for continuous work throughout the
year was a far superior working condition. He was astounded when "the Native
refused".17
Evidence of the conditions in Lydenburg indicates even more strongly that most
of the farmers who had an adequate labour supply were those that offered labour
tenant conditions. According to the official in charge of the labour bureau in
Lydenburg, the overwhelming majority of people looking for farm work were
labour tenants, and were only prepared to work under a labour tenant contract.
They found work on farms where the expected labour period was usually six
months labour, for no pay, and six months free time, during which they could
work for anyone they chose. For their labour they received land, which the farmer
often helped them plough, and the right to graze a limited number of cattle.18
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The evidence outlined above gives a sense of the general labour conditions in the
Lydenburg district.19 However, by looking at the conditions on one farm in the
district, Rooikrans, owned by Wessel Davel, it is possible to get a clearer and more
detailed sense of the kind of conditions that effectively attracted labour in 1955.
Davel was a fairly large farmer. He owned 10000 morgen. he planted crops on a
wide scale and at the same time kept a substantial flock of sheep. To manage this
large and diverse enterprise, Mr Davel kept 21 labour tenant families on his farm.
These people were, mostly, descendants of five families that had come to the farm
about sixty years previously. As soon as a young man from the farm got married,
Davel would approach him with an offer of a labour tenant contract. The
conditions of this contract basically consisted of the six months unpaid labour, six
months free time system prevalent in Lydenburg at this time. All the members of
the tenant family were expected to offer some labour and at harvest time Davel
would demand maximum labour which was rewarded with a 'bonus' cash wage.
Despite the fact that these conditions were harsher than conditions that had
prevailed in the 1930s, Davel maintained the loyalty of the resident families by
preserving the essence of the labour tenant system. The loyalty of the tenants can
also be explained by Davel's professed determination to go out of his way to treat
his labour well: "Want, hy redeneer, dan kry hy bevriedigende diens uit hulle."20
Davel's farm was not an anomaly in Lydenburg. One of the most prominent
farmers in the district, Mr Louis de Souza, was reported to have the same labour
conditions on his farm. Furthermore, it is clear that the treatment of labour played
a determining role in the maintenance of an adequate work force. According to a
labour tenant who worked for Louis de Souza's father, the conditions were
attractive on that farm because the tenants were able to have a say about their
working conditions. This meant that, "problems could be resolved through
discussions with the farmer." If an Induna on the farm was treating people badly,
the families could complain to the farmer and that Induna would be removed from
his position of authority. As a result of these practices, this farm worker, Mr
Sekwati Hlatswayo, stayed with De Souza, "for a long time". Mr Hlatswayo also
claimed that, "we preferred a farmer who handles people well, a farmer who did
not beat people. If we needed a place we would go to such a farmer."21
By 1955 the labour bureaux system was experiencing severe difficulties in making
any impact at all on the districts of Lydenburg and Middelburg. The majority of
Africans avoided it. Those that were registered as 'work-seekers' were able to find
ways of by-passing the controls that attempted to limit their ability to regulate the
conditions of their employment. Farmers who treated their labourers in an
unacceptable fashion still faced labour shortages as Africans refused to work for
them. Another farmer in Middelburg was unable to get labour despite all the
efforts of the labour bureaux. This was attributed to his bad reputation amongst
the local Africans. To them he was known as "the bull that shoves".22 Largely as
a result of this successful African resistance, farmers were often wary of the new
system and continued to deal with Africans outside the sphere of the bureaux.
In Belfast the establishment of a labour bureau was even more problematic. In
1954 two dairy farmers in the district complained that their production was
threatened because their labour tenants had left the farms. According to the one
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farmer, Mr Kobie Viljoen, the local Native Commissioner knew nothing of the
scheme "waar deur arbeid vir die boere gewerf kan word nie."23 By 1958 the
matter had not been cleared up and the Belfast Farmers Union launched a
comprehensive attack against the local state officials. The Union claimed that the
local bureau was giving labour tenants permission to leave the district for the cities
without consulting the farmers. They also maintained that the bureau did not
function properly because it lacked the trained personnel to handle 'native affairs'.
When farmers made requests for labour they were simply told that no labour was
available. Contrary to proper procedure their requests received no further attention.
As a result, labour tenants could come and go as they pleased and labour was
extremely difficult to obtain.
The reason for this unsatisfactory situation, according to the NAD, was that Belfast
fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. Thus, the local Magistrate,
accountable only to the Department of Justice, also served as the Native
Commissioner. The NAD claimed that local administration of 'native affairs' in
such areas suffered because of the lack of personnel that was available to Justice.
Justice was a smaller department than the NAD and was not allocated the same
resources to employ people.24 In Belfast, the labour bureaux was run on a part
time basis by a pensioner who was assisted by an African constable. It was also
felt that Justice officials did not have the necessary training and did not display
the proper amount of enthusiasm for their duties in the sphere of 'native
affairs'.25
The NAD put pressure on the Department of Justice to fill the labour bureaux post
with a permanent official. Justice replied that this was only possible when the
general personnel situation had improved. They did not seem overly concerned
about the situation in Belfast and claimed that running the bureau did not require
any 'specialised' skills. The failure to appeal to Justice, led the NAD to apply
direct pressure on the Magistrate of Belfast through the 'Streeks-
werksverskaffings-kommisaris' (SWVK), a new position in the Chief Native
Commissioner's office that held responsibility for the efficiency of labour bureaux
in most of the Transvaal.26 This pressure initially led the Magistrate to expel all
labour tenants from the town of Belfast. Although this action was favourably
received by the local farmers, tension between farmers and the Magistrate
continued. In July of 1959 a meeting was held between the two parties under the
chairmanship of the SWVK. At this meeting the Magistrate claimed that he
supplied the labour bureaux machinery but that farmers never made use of it.
Farmers on the other hand claimed that they were unaware of any such facilities.
It was agreed that the Magistrate would in future endeavour to inform farmers
about the bureau. Thus, although some form of cooperation between the
Magistrate and farmers was achieved in 1959, the bureau had not yet made an
effective impact on the district of Belfast.
A problem that was faced by the bureaux in all the districts under discussion was
the reluctance of farmers to register their tenants. Despite farmers' vociferous calls
for the strengthening of state control over Africans, they were reluctant to take a
direct part in this process. Farmers had an ambiguous attitude to bureaucratic
control. On the one hand, involved in a daily struggle with Africans over the terms
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of employment, they saw the benefits of state intervention on their behalf. On the
other, however, they were unwilling to allow the state to make crucial decisions
about their employment practices. They preferred to be personally involved in this
process. For example, a number of farmers believed that their ability to attract
labour lay in their 'knowledge' on how to conduct relations with Africans. They
were convinced that this gave them an advantage over other, less Toiowledgeable'
farmers; an advantage that the bureaux threatened to undermine. Similarly, they
believed that the bureaux jeopardised the general farm labour supply because
personal contact with Africans had always been one of the attractive features of the
farms. Such farmers were aware that they could not compete with urban industries
in terms of wages. Thus, they attracted labour by being sympathetic to other
demands made, by Africans. These demands included land, cattle and social
activities like beer drinks. This does not mean that farmers were genuinely more
sympathetic to Africans" demands, but the labour bureaux threatened to undermine
the farmers ability to negotiate on these issues.27 It also happened that farmers
did not necessarily regard Africans as being 'all alike'. Thus, some were concerned
to meet the people that were to live on their farms, before they hired them. If they
operated through the labour bureaux they would be forced to accept the labour of
particular Africans who were at that time available as unemployed, registered
'work seekers'.28
Another reason why farmers were reluctant to undertake registration lay in the
sheer hard and difficult work that was involved. A number of wool farmers
protested against the time consuming need to travel all over the farm to collect and
sign pass books and then commute all the way to town to get them stamped at the
Native Commissioners office. The farmers were especially upset because this
process had to take place every year.29 However, a more important cause of
farmer's unenthusiastic response to registration, especially in the district of
Lydenburg, lay in a strong tradition of African resistance to such Government
control. When Chapter Four was proclaimed in Lydenburg in 1938, labour tenants
had effectively opposed registration.30 At the time many had preferred to leave
farms in protest. Instances of mobilisation and mass action also took place. In
response, many farmers realised that government action produced a situation
where labour tenants fought as a group against farmers. Demands that occurred in
the isolation of the farm, on the other hand, kept the labour tenant community
divided.
It is not surprising then that farmers were wary of registering their labourers with
the labour bureaux. If farmers had no confidence in the ability of the bureaux to
keep their labour within the district, they were unlikely to take the risk of a mass
exodus of labour tenants, a situation which had nearly occurred in 1938.31 It
follows then that farmers needed time to gain confidence in the system and that
the bureaux had to prove itself to the farming community before it could work in
the hoped for, close alliance with farmers. Ironically, it was precisely the farmers
reluctance to register their labour that threatened to undermine the effectiveness
of the labour bureaux.
Over the next few years the labour bureaux in the districts of the mid-eastern
Transvaal strove to win the confidence of farmers and prove that the bureaux could
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supply the control that would undermine the ability of tenants to resist. The first
area where labour bureaux began to have an effective impact was in the 'locations'
of the rural towns. These areas where much easier to police because of their more
concentrated and manageable character. The local labour bureaux in most districts
kept strict records, listing all the female and male Africans that were living in the
'location' and the 'white area' of the town. Most of the local bureaux in the mid-
eastern Transvaal reported that regular raids were carried out against both illegal
foreigners and 'leegleers' (wont works).32 The latter group were persecuted in
terms of section 36 of the Native Laws Amendment Act. This legislation gave 'any
authorised officer' the right to evict a person he believed was habitually
unemployed. Most local bureaux reported successes and effective monitoring in
this regard. For example in 1956, Middelburg reported that there were only four
'leegleers' left and that these would be dealt with shortly.
The local labour bureaux co-operated with the districts by not permitting the right
of residence or employment in town to anyone unless it was approved by the
district labour bureaux. This agreement eventually grew into a determination by
the local bureaux to not let any one employed as a labour tenant, presently or
previously, into town. The extent to which this policy was successful is difficult
to assess. Despite bureaux claims to the contrary, it seems probable that tenants
could still find people in town who were prepared to employ them, especially if
they had worked for such people for a long period of time. Regional conditions
also had an effect on the success of this policy. The size of the Lydenburg
'location' ,for example, made the effective implementation of this policy
problematic. According to the town clerk, the 'location' was only able to provide
twenty per cent of the labour needs of the town. The rest of the work ha the town
was carried out by migrant labour from the farms and the African settlement called
Boomplaats. The labour supply from Boomplaats was also threatened because the
government had decided to remove this 'black spot'. Because of this situation, the
town clerk asked for permission to hold off the law barring labour tenants from
the town. In the mean time the town would proceed with plans to build housing
for an adequate labour force. The only way to populate this expanding 'location'
was to allow labour tenants and people from Boomplaats to be considered for this
housing.33 Thus, in Lydenburg, at the end of 1955, labour tenants were still given
a local, 'urban' alternative to work on the farms. It was also agreed that labour
tenants could work in the towns in their free period as long as their employers
made sure that they got back to the farms on time.
By 1958, many of the local bureaux claimed that all 'leegleers' had been expelled
and that no labour tenants were being permitted to work in the town.34 Regular
raids were reportedly being carried out in the districts of Middelburg, Ermelo and
Carolina. By 1959, Belfast also claimed to have cleared the town of labour
tenants.35 In Carolina it was discovered that absentee farmers who lived in the
town were employing Africans from their farms, in the towns. It was emphasised
that the bureaux would not tolerate such exceptions to the rule. These Africans had
to go through the registration process. Africans who were outside the control of the
local labour bureaux could not live in the town.36 From the bureaucratic point of
view, the situation in Lydenburg also became 'more satisfactory' by 1958. The
shortage of labour had been overcome and the 'location' had been expanded to
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accommodate three quarters of the town's labour requirements. A large proportion
of the remaining demand was met by Africans from the reserves who had been
registered with the district bureaux. The opportunities for labour tenants had thus,
significantly diminished.37
Thus, the attempt to diminish the movement between town and countryside in the
individual districts seems to have been quite successful by 1958. The effect that
this had on the lives of Africans can be demonstrated by the problems faced by Mr
Abram Nkosi. He had been working, on and off, at an old age home in
Middelburg. However, he now faced eviction because he did not qualify for
residence in town. He had not been working for a continuous period of 10 years
for one employer, which would have qualified him for section 10 rights.
Furthermore he was born on a farm and had spent some time working on the
farms. This caused him to be classified as a labour tenant He was thus advised to
look for work on the farms. The alternatives to this option were rapidly vanishing.
An area in Middelburg which had always presented a less controlled alternative
to residence in the town and on the farms, was the African settlement of
Doornkop. However, this settlement was now facing a full scale removal.
Furthermore, the implementation of Chapter Four in Middelburg had made
'squatting' on the farms more difficult. As a result of Mr Nkosi's inability to find
residence, his employment in town, which probably paid very well and at which
he was extremely proficient, was threatened. His employer made a plea to the
government on his behalf, but, to no avail. In the end Abram settled in Doornkop
to await the removal, and the destruction of his career as a respected attendant at
the old age home.38
In the case of Abram Nkosi, the implementation of Chapter Four in Middelburg
affected his ability to find residence on the farms. The much awaited
implementation of this chapter did not, however, have a uniform effect in the
districts of the mid-eastern Transvaal. The chapter was perceived as an extremely
sensitive subject by the state because its provisions allowed for the state's direct
intervention in the labour practices of certain farmers. Although this action was to
be in the interest of other farmers, who were presumed to be the majority, the
National Party government was extremely wary of alienating any section of the
farming community. Thus, in 1956, after a number amendments had made the
chapter ready for implementation, Verwoerd warned the officials of the NAD to
exercise extreme caution. Verwoerd was particularly worried that grievances against
Chapter Four and the Labour Tenant Control Boards would become 'political
issues' in the upcoming general election. As a result he advised the boards to take
action only if blatant transgressions of the act occurred. He hoped that, for the time
being, the boards would concentrate their efforts on gathering information
concerning the labour situation in their districts.39
Thus, Labour Tenant Control Boards were tentatively set up in the districts of the
mid-eastern Transvaal in 1957. These boards consisted of two appointed, bonafide
farmers, and the Native Commissioner who served as the chairman. The basic task
of the boards was to redistribute surplus labour tenants. A farmer found to have
more labour tenants living on his land than he needed to effectively run his farm,
would be asked to evict those surplus tenants. These labourers would then be
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made available to other farmers by means of the labour bureaux. The provision of
the 1936 version of Chapter Four, that made it the responsibility of the state to find
accommodation for evicted labour tenants, had been repealed. In the new system,
section 38 (b) (ii) directed "that every endeavour should be made to place ejected
labour tenants in employment".40 Those tenants who refused this employment
were expected to find another place of residence. The fact that residence rights
could only be granted by the labour bureaux was expected to make such refusal
extremely difficult. In particular, urban areas were to be barred to evicted labour
tenants by such means. Farmers were also, once again, asked to register all their
labour tenants.
In addition to the hesitant Government backing that they received, numerous other
factors also contributed to the boards' problems. In the middle of 1957 the Native
Commissioner of Middelburg outlined some of the difficulties experienced by his
board. The Commissioner felt impelled to undertake some action because of the
reports of large scale 'illegal squatting' that his board was receiving. It was alleged
that Africans were living on farms in the vicinity of coal mines, where they
worked. The squatter communities that facilitated this migrancy also brewed liquor
and provided a place where mine workers could congregate without supervision.
Some of these farms were alleged to contain villages consisting of seventy five
huts.
The Labour Tenant Board found it impossible to prosecute these cases because
they were unable to distinguish labour tenants or squatters from full time servants.
If a farmer claimed that the Africans on his farm were full time servants, there was
little the board could do.41 There was no limit on the full time servants that a
farmer could keep. The Native Commissioner also complained that his board was
handicapped by the nature of its personnel: "My committee members are farmers
and find it difficult to spare the time to make thorough investigations."42
In Lydenburg the board also became incapacitated when faced with farmer's
refusal to co-operate. C.F. Ackermann owned six farms in the Lydenburg district
but lived two hundred miles outside the district. When the board requested him
to do so, Mr Ackermann refused to appear before it. The farmers that sat on the
board, in turn refused to take action against a fellow farmer who had not had a
chance to defend himself. The Native Commissioner declared himself helpless to
undertake any further action. The state was unwilling to bring Mr Ackermann
before the board by force and the matter seems to have been dropped.43 The
attitude of the farmers on this board reflects a general tendency identified by
Senator Le Roux of the SAAU Liaison Committee: "In die algemeen is 'n boer nie
geneig om teen 'n burman klagtes in te dien.'144 In the absence of effective farm
inspections, the boards had to rely on such complaints, which, as a result of
fanners attitudes, were not as forthcoming as expected. The NAD did appoint
inspectors in an attempt to overcome this problem. However, there were only two
for the Northern Areas and by 1960 they had only carried out inspections on some
of the farms in the districts of Louis Trichardt, Pietersburg and Tzaneen.45
In Carolina, the failure of the board to proceed according to NAD guidelines
caused farmers to protest about over-zealous inspections. Whereas Justice
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Department jurisdiction had produced an inactive labour bureaux in Belfast, in
Carolina it had the opposite effect on the Labour Tenant Board. Instead of
proceeding at the cautious pace recommended, the Carolina board ascertained the
labour supply on all the farms in the district. Following this survey the board
proceeded to send recommendations to all the farmers on how many labour tenants
they were allowed to keep. More than seventy farmers were told to reduce their
labour in this manner. Farmers voiced loud protests about this large-scale and
arbitrary interference in their affairs. In the uproar the board defended itself by
claiming that these were only recommendations that would probably not be carried
out. Nevertheless, farmers complained to their member of parliament, who was
also the Minister of Post and Tele-communications, Dr Hertzog.46 The NAD
emphatically pointed out to the Department of Justice that these procedures were
contrary to Article 29 of the chapter as well as NAD policy, and should cease
before more friction between farmers and the bureaucracy resulted.
From the evidence outlined above, it is not surprising that in 1958 the NAD felt
that, "met die uitvoering van Hoofstuk Vier is miskien nie so fluks gevorder as
wat verwag kon word nie maar dit is 'n nuwe skema wat tyd geneem het om by
die boer gemeenskap bekend te word".47 Nevertheless, despite the problems, the
NAD seemed to hold out some hope for the future. In Middelburg this optimism
seemed justified as the Labour Tenant Control Board there reported a number of
successes. The farmers Davel, Steenkamp, Weimer, Louw and De Villiers were
held to collectively have 58 families in excess of their needs. Most of these families
were subsequently removed by order of the board. Only five managed to stay on
the farms.48 Reports of forced removals were also starting to reach NAD head
office. In cases where tenants refused to move, it was decided to issue them with
a 'heavy suspended fine' in terms of section 1 of Act 22 of 1951. If such tenants
still refused to move they would be served with an ejectment order in terms of
section 3 of Act 52 of 1951. These tenants would then be carted off the farms in
NAD 'trust lorries' with the assistance of the police.49
Despite their patchy effectiveness, the Labour Tenant Boards interfered in the
labour relationships on the farms in an unprecedented fashion. When, during the
1940s, the NAD had proposed farm inspections, farmers raised a storm of protest.
The new NAD measures raised less protest because they were perceived as being
much more directly in the interest of farmers. However, it is evident that not all
farmers were prepared to cooperate with the boards. This lack of enthusiasm was
sometimes caused by the nature of relationships on the farms. Despite the
overwhelming evidence that farmers strove on a daily basis to increase the
oppression and exploitation of their labour, some farmers, in the isolation of their
farms, developed a genuine allegiance to the Africans living and working with
them; especially when labour tenant families had been resident on a particular
farm for a number of generations.50 In Badfontein, Lydenburg, a farmer refused
to comply with the ruling of the board. He referred to the labour tenants as "my
volk". His father had grown up with the heads of the tenant families when they
were children. Under pressure from the board, he called together all the Africans
living on his farm and told them of the ruling. He told them it was up to them to
decide who should leave and who could stay. He himself could not undertake the
cruel act of evicting African families he had known all his life.51
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The conclusion drawn from the evidence presented above is that Chapter Four did
seriously affect the freedom of some labour tenants. But, by 1960 these effects were
still only thinly spread over the districts of the mid-eastern Transvaal. In that year,
the Machadadorp Farmers Union in the district of Belfast claimed that the main
objective of Chapter Four had not been reached: "Daar is nog steeds geen
reelmatige verspreiding van plaasarbeid nie."52 The union claimed that on a
number of farms, the increasing congregation of labour tenant families was taking
place. Some of these families paid rent to the farmer and most of them were
expected to work for a very short time. Farmers that could or would not offer such
conditions were often forced to rely on prison labour. The Belfast Labour Tenant
Control Board was more specific about the conditions in that district. The
distribution of labour ranged from no workers on a farm to seventy Africans on
one farm. It was estimated by the board that a particular farmer who kept seventy
Africans on his farm needed only twenty of these people to run his farm. As a
result of these practices, the board claimed, thirty percent of the farms housed
Africans that were thirty percent in excess of their labour needs. The board also
stated that in its three years of existence, not one of its many resolutions had been
put into effect.
Chapter Four had no effect in Belfast. In Lydenburg and Mid del burg the Labour
Tenant Control Boards faced many difficulties and were only partially successful.
In Ermelo protestations about absentee farmers that permitted Africans to 'squat'
where still widespread in I960.53 Complaints from all over South Africa about the
ineffectiveness of Chapter Four led, in the same year, to the calling up of an inter-
departmental committee that, rather than persisting with attempts to redistribute
labour tenants, decided to consider the total abolishment of the labour tenant
system. This decision to abandon the policy, proves that, despite the devastation
of a number of peoples' lives, in the final analysis, Chapter Four failed as a state
policy.54
Labour Bureaux, on the other hand, were not abandoned as a farm labour policy.
At the end of 1956 the Lydenburg labour bureau reported that the situation was
improving. A number of Africans were beginning to use the labour bureau. This
allowed the bureau to meet the demand for labour of those farmers that made use
of the 'proper channels'. However, they continued to represent a minority. Most
farmers persisted with their own labour recruiting and were still not prepared to
register their labourers. But, in 1958 a further change in attitudes was reported. In
March of that year it was claimed that farmers were now arriving regularly to
register their labourers. By 1959 some farmers were even handing in written
requests for labour. In Middelburg things also improved slightly by 1958. Africans
were using the bureau and were being sent out to the farms with the proper form
in their possession. However, farmers hardly ever returned the bottom of this form
which made it impossible for the bureaux to maintain tabs on who was working
for whom.55 In Ermelo, 1958 saw an appreciable increase in registrations. Many
farmers still preferred to 'find' their labour themselves. However, the first 20 days
of the month of May saw the registration of three hundred farm labourers.
According to the bureaux the 'big employers' in the district had registered
practically all their labour. By 1959 nearly all the labour had been registered and
registration was regularly being renewed.56 In Belfast, during 1959, farmers were
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reportedly regarding the bureaux in a more favourable light. However, by 1960 still
hardly any registration was taking place.57
On the whole it would seem that the co-operation between the bureaux and the
farmers had improved by 1960. The increase in registrations can be explained by
a number of factors. The increasing ability of labour bureaux to control Africans,
especially in the prescribed areas, could have given farmers greater confidence in
the ability of the bureaux. People eager for redistribution of labour in terms of
Chapter Four, which also required registration, could have become more aware of
the benefits of registration. Furthermore, the supply of labour in the farming
districts grew steadily during the fifties. In Lydenburg the number of Africans
resident in the district grew from 40000 in 1955 to 47000 at the end of 1956.58 In
Carolina there were approximately 32000 Africans in 1957. By 1958 this figure had
expanded to 36000.59 This expansion can partly be explained by the effects that
the urban bureaux were beginning to have at this time.*0 Marcus claims that the
bureaux were instrumental in channeling urban Africans back into the rural areas,
thus reversing the ever increasing flow of rural Africans into the towns.61 Lazar's
figures support this contention: "by 1953,21,823 African workers from urban areas
had been placed by the labour bureaux in employment in agriculture; and between
the middle of 1954 and the end of 1957 another 268,705 workers were directed back
to white farms".62 The generally increasing supply of labour naturally made
farmers less nervous about Africans leaving their districts and thus, made them
less wary of registering their labour. Furthermore, these uprooted urban dwellers
were probably happy to find any kind of labour and were not as ready to 'boycott'
farmers.
Despite these improvements, a number of farmers continued to express
dissatisfaction with the bureaux. A prominent member of the Transvaal
Agricultural Union maintained in 1960 that farmers and Africans did not like using
the bureaux system because of its impersonal nature. This farmer was of the
opinion that the system needed to be revised. He believed that, "as jy daar die boer
in persoonlike kontak met die naturel kon bring, dat hy dan 'n kans het om sukses
te behaal om horn te ooreed om na die landbou te kom. Dit is 'n kwessie van man
tot man kontakt - menslike verhoudings. Hy moet verhoudings op bou met die
naturel. Soos ek die naturel ken hou hy daarvan om sy eie base te soek. Die buro's
behandel horn te veel as 'n kommoditeit."63 Thus, reservations about the effects
of bureaucratic control continued to be expressed.
Apart from these reservations, farmers were still not totally convinced about the
bureaux's ability to control the movement of labour tenants. Thus, despite the
increase in registration, the relationship between many farmers and the
bureaucracy remained uneasy. In 1957 a farmer in Lydenburg reported that his
farm workers were leaving the district to work at the dam construction on the
Pienaars River. According to the farmer, the labour tenants, "trek eenvoudig sonder
toestemming van die naturelle kommissaris".64 The Native Commissioner assured
him that these labour tenants should be brought back to Lydenburg but, no action
had been taken. The NAD found that the families of the labour tenants were still
living on the farm, which indicated that they intended to come back to the farm
when their 'free period' had elapsed. However, it is clear that what made the
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farmer nervous was the labour bureaux's inability to prevent Africans from moving
beyond the borders of the district. Farmers hoped that labour tenants would now
use their free time to work only in the district of the farm. This would make
control and the certainty of their return a much more manageable task. This is
borne out by a farmer in Middelburg who was upset about the freedom of his
labour tenants to go where they pleased in search of work. This farmer gave his
labour tenant a 'work pass' for the specific purpose of finding temporary work in
the town of Middelburg. Instead, this African went to Pretoria and found work in
a building company.65 The labour bureau clearly had no knowledge of this move.
Labour bureaux in the districts were more successful in preventing labour tenants
from taking up employment, without farmer's permission, at relatively well paid
road works. This was partly because the farmer and the illegal employer both fell
under the jurisdiction of the same bureaux. In Ermelo this practice, which had
been a source of farmer's complaints for decades, was effectively reversed. The
bureau forced the roads department to register all the workers in their employ.
Subsequently, all those Africans who originated from the farms, had to be sent
back.66
However, the district bureaux could not be very effective in preventing Africans
from leaving their jurisdictions. The real onus fell on the bureaux of the urban
areas, to which labour tenants often migrated in their free period. It has been
shown that the urban bureaux were successful in forcing large numbers into the
rural areas. It is less clear, however, how successful they were in keeping migrating
labour tenants out. In Pretoria, the evidence indicates that, by 1960, it was
becoming increasingly difficult for labour tenants to find accommodation and
work. Labour tenants were still allowed to work in Pretoria. However, this only
applied to 2261 labour tenants that had been registered before 1960. No new
registrations were permitted. Further, if a labour tenant stayed away from Pretoria
for a period of twelve months, his registration would not be renewed. Labour
tenants, during their six to eight month 'free period', lived in the hostels and
backyard shacks of Pretoria's 'locations'. This residency came under fire in 1960.
In that year the town council was in the process of 'removing' all farm labourers
from the backyard shacks. They intended to only permit residence in the hostels
where control was easier. Sixteen new inspectors had been appointed to make
regular inspections of the backyard residences, with the aim of arresting 'illegals'.
Despite the tightening of control, numerous Africans were entering Pretoria
illegally. Many of these were discovered and expelled when they tried to find jobs.
However, a number managed to stay on in Pretoria. One method of avoiding
detection was to acquire two pass books. Labour tenants would claim to have lost
their books and would duly be issued with a duplicate. They would then use this
duplicate only when they were in town and keep the other pass for the farms.
There would thus be no evidence of their origins from the farms when they looked
for jobs in town. In 1960 there were 112 labour tenants from Belfast and 358 from
Middelburg, working in Pretoria with the knowledge of the town council. An
unspecified number were there without official knowledge.67 However, due to
tightening controls and the expansion of bureaucratic personnel, the movement
between town and country was becoming more and more difficult.
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The increasing effectiveness of labour bureaux in districts, rural towns and cities
was undermining the capacity of labour tenants to use mobility and alternative
employment as a threat against farmers. Other factors were contributing to this
dilemma. The fact that farmers were generally less desperate for labour meant that
fewer farmers were willing to take in Africans on the terms they demanded.
According to Mr Petrus Magolego, the introduction of telephones in the 1950s also
served to limit African mobility because it gave farmers the ability to confer with
each other before hiring anyone. If an African came to look for work, the farmer
would first phone his previous employer. If the African had left the farm because
of a dispute with the owner, then the farmers would often decide to deny this
person a job because he was marked as a 'trouble maker7.68
The bureaucratic control of African farm workers in the mid-eastern Transvaal,
implemented by the National Party controlled state, brought the state into the lives
of both whites and blacks in an unprecedented way. The largely negative reaction
of these people combined with a number of administrative problems, served to
inhibit the new bureaucracy. But, throughout this process, the NAD attempted to
implement its new vision without alienating white farmers. Eventually this patient
approach began to win a number of farmers over. The growing confidence in the
system displayed by the farmers began to combine with an expanding,69
increasingly efficient bureaucracy. These factors were, by 1960, seriously affecting
the ability of labour tenants to move freely and find alternatives to farm labour.
In the words of Mrs Rose Masilela: "It was difficult to move from place to place
if you already had a pass. Before this boys could run away if conditions were not
good on the farm. But, the pass put restrictions on this through registrations."70
Africans' struggle to maintain a capacity to control the conditions under which
they lived, has a long history. A number of significant successes, both big and
small, were achieved along the way. But, the expanded policies of the National
Party made the possibilities of such successes much more remote. The horizons of
rural Africans were effectively being narrowed by state control.
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